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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The objective of the research was to define whether competition has any
noticeable effect on profitability of enterprises in Ukraine, country that
experiences a difficult period of transition.
In Ukraine, after several years of transformation earlier centrally planned
industries shaped into more or less competitive configurations; markets
started to acquire structures. How does market structure affect actors at
a market? Does monopolization lead to higher profitability? What is the
role of the foreign competition? A number of theories have been elabo-
rated in order to define the relationship between performance and mar-
kets structure. Many were supported by studies of developed economies
as well as partially supported with evidences from economies in transi-
tion. This research approaches the problem of "profitability — market
structure" interrelation in Ukraine.
Generally, theory positively relates profitability and market power; spe-
cifically, the higher is monopolization, the higher profitability that firms
enjoy. This statement was first empirically tested by J. Bain (1951) who
used the so-called Structure-Conduct-Performance approach. Current
research, defined in this tradition, uses linear econometric specification
relating profitability to variables that embody competition factors and in-
dustries' specificities.
In order to differentiate between national and local competition two sam-
ples are used: nationwide with variables calculated at the national level
and regional with variables computed at the level of region-industries.
Besides, in order to define whether the relationship between concentra-
tion and profitability varies with different levels of geographic concentra-
tion and whether local markets could be a source of market power, a
number of concentration indices as well as concentration indices' inter-
actions are tested within the model.
Further, it is maintained that concentration may be endogenous to profit-
ability. To handle such limitation, this study used instrumental variable
approach employing pre-reform concentration (exogenous to today's
profitability) in instruments' estimation.
Data consists of reported firms' financial indices from the Ukrainian in-
dustrial registry (11,045 enterprises in 1998 and 8,134 in 1994) and of
statistics on international trade.
Econometric analysis yielded following results: At the national level, con-
centration indices did not show any noteworthy effect on profitability.
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However, at the regional level monopolistic power may increase profit-
ability. Finally, research suggested that international trade could be a
good disciplinary tool.
Results of this study partially refuted notion that monopolistic power
leads to higher profits. At least in Ukraine, being a nationwide monopo-
list does not automatically imply evident excess profitability. There are
some possible explanations of this contradiction. First, the year of in-
terest — 1998 — was characterized by macroeconomic difficulties
caused by the international financial crises. Second, data itself may be
inaccurate and/or biased. However, I would also suggest another ex-
planation.
In Ukraine, it is very hard to identify the actual configuration of markets.
Structures of industries are heavily distorted due to extensive practices
of vertical and horizontal integration. Started with privatization, an inces-
sant chain of mergers and acquisitions created a situation when one firm
may dominate several markets; whole industries could in fact be owned
by a single business group. Markets' over-regulation, widespread crony
relationships between business and government, lack of efficient bank-
ruptcy legislation render usual and commonly accepted market structure
indicators futile. Likewise, market forces may fail to function under the
burden of non-market regulations and institutions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, former Soviet Union econo-
mies, including Ukrainian one, were non-optimal designed as a direct
plan system. Reforms, on the other hand, affected economic systems,
and today one can observe quasi-market structures, which are liable to
market forces. Some markets began their movement in the direction of
competition; others started to develop towards monopoly. More compe-
tition might mean an increase in productive and allocative efficiency,
whereas an inherited or acquired monopolistic power would lead to dis-
torted pricing and collection of excess profits.
While theory and many empirical studies positively relate profitability and
market power, there is some doubt as to what is the actual nature of
profitability-market structure interrelation. These doubts could be further
widened: even if the interrelation is assumed positive, does this rule work
under conditions of transition? More generally: are market forces strong
enough to affect an over-regulated economy? The present paper tries to
shed light on this question using Ukrainian economy as an object. Re-
vealing the relationship between market structure and performance
would be helpful: considerable profitability of highly concentrated mar-
kets would indicate the use of market power and signify the necessity of
government interventions in order to improve competition.
The most applicable method of structure-performance analysis in
Ukraine is the so-called Structure-Conduct-Performance approach origi-
nally employed by J. Bain (1951). This research, defined in the Bain tra-
dition, studies the influence of various market structure determinants on
the profitability of enterprises. The basic hypothesis argues that higher
market concentration of a market improves profitability.
This paper contributes to the existent literature in several ways. First, it
tests the idea that structure affects profitability using the new data of an
emerging economy, Ukraine. Second, unlike previous studies of Ukraine,
which use small samples of firms, this research employs the comprehen-
sive database of manufacturing enterprises consisting of 11045 firm-
entries classified in 289 industries for the year 1998. Third, in contrast to
available researches, which investigate the problem of structure-
profitability interrelation marginally, together with a range of other issues,
the present study focuses solely on structure-profitability interrelation in
Ukraine. Finally, there are many studies of market structure & profitability
based on Russian economy. Ukraine resembles Russia in economic
sense, having nevertheless significant differences (geography, speciali-
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zation, and infrastructure). This research gives a chance to compare
characteristics of these two economies, which were a single whole in the
past, as well as to compare new findings with the studies of other
emerging economies.
The results of present study can be summarized as follows: concentra-
tion has no significant effect on profitability at the nationwide level. Esti-
mated parameters of various concentration indices are negative and in-
significant at the nationwide level and positive but also insignificant at the
level of local industries. Thus, competition possibly matters only at the
level of regional markets. International trade is a good source of compe-
tition. Negative significant estimates of the import penetration ratios
suggest that import acts as a disciplinary mechanism.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes relevant
prior research experience and outlines the conceptual framework of the
study. Section 3 describes data and econometric approaches and dis-
cusses results. Section 4 presents several concluding remarks.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE/CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
For many years industrial economists have been studying the relationship
between performance and concentration indices. Cowling and Waterson
(1976) proved the direct interdependence between Herfindahl–Hirsch-
man concentration index (HHI) and price-cost margin (PCM):
2
i
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−
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That is, the HHI divided by the absolute value of the market demand
elasticity equals the weighted average of the firms' price-cost margin.
The theory was tested many times and, in many cases, this relationship
holds. However, due to the imperfect measures of price-cost margins
and due to other influences in the general model, several other aspects
of industry structure are often included. Comanor and Wilson (1967) ar-
gue that advertising substantially influences concentration. Guth (1971),
Strickland and Weiss (1976), Lee (1986), Gabel (1979) used advertising
variables to explain the monopolization level and profitability. Caves
(1980), Chou (1986), and Helpman (1997) revealed the influence of FDI
& on concentration indices and performance. Jacquemin, Ghellinck, and
Huveneers (1980), Chou (1986), Barton and Caves (1990) examined the
effect of international trade on competitive environment and production
performance.
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Many researchers, particularly in recent years, studied productive effi-
ciency focusing on the estimation of production function and analyzing
the influence of different factors on TFP. Through 70s and 80s, consid-
erable number of studies continued using Bain's (1951, 1956) practice
testing the interrelationship between industry-average profitability and
concentration. They found only weak evidence of positive interrelation
between profitability and concentration. Whereas such results could be
associated with poor data and/or measuring drawbacks, the problem of
concentration-performance interrelation in Demsetz's (1973) interpreta-
tion is also worth attention: in modern economies, concentration indeed
may directly depend on market forces; firms that are more efficient can
conquer markets. Nevertheless, in post-socialist economies the depend-
ence of concentration on market forces is negligible. Concentration is
more likely to be defined exogenously by the centrally planned economy.
Brown and Earl (2000) also support this point of view.
Besides, there are several other approaches. Sutton's theory is among
them. Sutton generated robust and testable predictions from the theory
of strategic behavior. The basic theoretical notion is that in homogenous
type 1 industries, characterized by exogenous sunk cost, the traditional
inverse structure-size relation holds. However, in type 2 industries, char-
acterized by endogenous sunk costs, as market size becomes very
large, firms may escalate their advertising and/or R&D expenditure in re-
sponse, and the inverse structure-size relation may break down. Sutton's
own empirical work confirms his predictions combining cross-section
analysis with industry case studies.
In Ukraine, market structures are starting to change. Advertising market
has grown substantially. This indicates that industries could be discrimi-
nated now by the level of product differentiation. Some markets are be-
coming type 1, others — type 2. Still, the precise analysis of available
data for transition economies reveals that today it is still difficult to study
concentration in view of Sutton theory.
In recent years, with the appearance of de novo market economies, the
new subject of the analysis emerged — economies in transition. Since the
present research considers the Ukrainian transition economy, mentioned
literature segment is of the particular importance. Several issues are in
the focus here. Productive efficiency and factors that affect it (ownership
structure, competition, trade, FDI, soft budget constraints, infrastructure
and institutions) is the most frequent theme. Earle and Estrin (1998),
Brown and Brown (1998, 1999), Brown and Earle (2000) studied Russian
economy. Konings (1997), Angelucci, Estrin, Konings, and Zolkieski
(2001), Konings, Van Cayseele, and Warzynski (2001), Klinedinst and
Rock (1998) devoted their research to comparative studies of Bul-
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garia, Romania, Poland and Hungary; Konings and Xavier (2002) studied
the determinants of firms' survival and growth in Slovenia. Carlin, Fries,
Schaffer, and Seabright (2001) made a cross-country survey focusing on
the competition and enterprise performance in transition economies.
Many studies verified the concept that competition, whether domestic or
foreign, improves productive efficiency. However, the idea of an increase
in price-cost margins with higher monopolization received only a partial
proof. In Brown and Brown (1998), there is the weak evidence that in
Russia higher concentration leads to higher profits at the nationwide
level, although at local markets monopolistic power is an advantage em-
bodied in higher profitability. In Konings, Van Cayseele, and Warzynski
(2001), in Bulgaria the higher concentration leads to higher profits, but
this is not proven for Romania.
Attempting to verify the idea that higher price-cost margins are associ-
ated with monopolized markets, this study will principally follow Brown
and Brown (1998) using the linear specification relating profitability to
the variables that embody competition factors and industries' specifici-
ties (controls):
Profitability = f (Competition Factors, Controls).
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
3.1. Specification
Profitability. Rate of return, the measure of how much is earned per
dollar of investment, was once considered as the most appropriate
gauge of performance. Other financial ratios of performance are ROA
(the net profit after taxes per dollar of assets) and ROE (the net profits
after taxes per dollar of equity capital).
However, many studies have shown that accounting measures like the
rate of return may fail to measure economic profits or costs accurately,
especially when long-lived capital assets are present. In transition
economies, accounting profit is much more dubious measure of per-
formance because of misreporting. To avoid these problems the study
uses an alternative measure of performance, the Lerner index or price-
cost margin, (P–MC)/P, that shows difference between price, P, and
marginal cost, MC, as a fraction of price.
Alas, because the genuine price-cost margin is rarely available, re-
searchers use "price-average variable cost" margin instead of appropri-
ate "price — marginal cost" margin. This approximation to the price av-
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erage cost variable is calculated as sales revenues minus payroll minus
material cost divided by sales.
With available data on Ukrainian enterprises, it is possible to estimate a
number of profitability ratios. The first is PCM estimated as sales less
total production cost divided by sales. This is the most close markup es-
timation available now. Data also allows estimating the share of profits in
sales PS as profits before profit tax divided by sales, and the share of
profit in total production cost PO as profits before profit tax divided by
total production cost.
Market Structure. Market concentration is the most regular proxy for mar-
ket structure. The most common statistical measure of concentration as an
index of market structure is the so-called "k-firm concentration ratio" Ck,
which is the share of industry sales accounted for by k largest firms:
1
K
i
i
Ck s
=
= ∑ ,
where si is the share of the i-th firm.
It is arbitrary to choose the number of firms k. In empirical testing C4 is
the most common index. Other measures are used as well. For example,
the US government has published eight-firm concentration ratios, C8.
The major drawback of such index is that it implicitly assumes equal
weighting to all firms in the sample, and thus it fails to take into account
information concerning the size distribution of firms in the industry
(Bevan, Estrin, Schaffer, 1999).
To make concentration index more representative one could employ a
function of all individual firms' market shares, HHI, defined as the sum of
the squared values of firms' shares calculated as follows:
2
1
n
i
i
HHI S
=
= ∑ ,
where Si — the share of i-th firm at the market, n — total quantity of
firms at the market. The higher is the HHI , the bigger the monopoliza-
tion of the market.
Concentration measures have several serious drawbacks. To be usable
in studies, an index of structure should be exogenous, where exogenous
implies that structure is determined before profitability and that profit-
ability does not affect structure. If the measure of structure is deter-
mined by profitability, or endogenously determined, the estimates would
be inconsistent. For that purpose, one needs to develop an instrumental
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variable. Brown and Brown (1998) use the last year before transition
1991 (in that year concentration was not affected by market forces) in
order to filter out the endogenous profitability-caused portion of the
change in concentration. In Ukraine, reforms started three years later.
Pre-reform (1994) concentration ratios help to develop instruments for
concentration in this research. On the contrary, in post-soviet econo-
mies, Ukrainian is among them, market structures are hardly affected by
market forces because the structure was formed under the Soviet cen-
trally planned system. Soviet planners could have been taking into ac-
count cost optimization, but one barely would argue that structure was
determined by market efficiency considerations in the SU. Market struc-
ture should be changing while the transition processes — privatization
and restructuring — result in new ownership redistribution. Still, these
developments have little in common with market force influences. Hence,
the endogeneity drawback, rather serious while analyzing western
economies within SCP framework, is not that significant in post-soviet
economy's studies. Nevertheless, it is useful to employ instrumental vari-
able (IV) methodology to avoid potential estimation bias.
Another crucial weakness of regular concentration ratios is that they are
commonly calculated based on industries — industrial index of concen-
tration. Yet, the official classification of industries fails to reflect the
genuine product market nature. For instance, an enterprise producing a
wide variety of products has one industry code. The best way would be
to calculate indices based on the product market concept. Still, data
constraints allow us to employ only the "second-best", commonly used
method of industrial concentration.
Further, concentration ratios could be estimated as nationwide or re-
gional. Typically, nation-level concentration is under consideration. Yet,
some industries, being apparently competitive countrywide, in fact enjoy
monopolistic power at the local markets. Therefore, local (in this re-
search — regional) concentration ratio HHI_R is employed in the region-
ally disaggregated sample model (Region-industry model).
Let us go on with elaboration of concentration ratios. To start with, two
most common concentration ratios HHI_N and C4 are calculated. The
important remark about them is that both are obtained for the national
level. HHI_R is similar to HHI_N apart from it is calculated at the level of
region-industry.
Further, let us assume that firms within a region compete only with local
companies (enjoy higher monopolistic power) but they face higher com-
petition embodied in the national HHI_N outside the region. In other
words, if there were an industry with a limited number of producers lo-
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cated in one region only, they would operate nationwide. Conversely, if
every region has at least one enterprise of some industry, these firms
would operate mainly in their own regions. Constructing the appropriate
concentration measure that would embody options of local and national
competition, this study follows Brown and Earle (2001) and uses the lin-
ear combination of HHI_N and HHI_R (described above). The mixed
HHI_M is calculated as follows:
HHI_M = HHI_R*Prop + HHI_N*(1 – Prop),
where Prop is the proportion of regions with at least one producer in a
given industry. This concentration measure is employed in the Region-
industry model.
To compensate for possible underestimation of national concentration ra-
tios one may introduce into the model the ratio of geographic production
dispersion DISP calculated as follows:
1
2
ij i
i
j
s SP
DISP
−
= −
∑
,
where sij is the share of the j-th industry's output in the i-th region and
SPi is the share of population in the i-th region. The intuition behind this
index is clear-cut: if the geographic dispersion of the output of an industry
tends to be the same as the geographic dispersion of the population in the
country (DISP → 1), the market has regional nature (e.g. dairy, baking, or
confectionery industries), otherwise production could be regionally con-
centrated and such industry could sell countrywide. A very close idea is
exemplified in another index — the index of raw geographic concentration
GC used by Ellison and Glaeser (1994). The discussion of differences be-
tween DISP and GC is included in the Appendices.
High regional concentration may lead to collusions and mergers. Moreo-
ver, the very relationship between concentration and profitability can vary
in industries with different levels of geographic concentration (Brown and
Brown, 1998). To catch the idea of regional markets competition and to
take into account the above stated observations, this study uses concen-
tration interactions multiplying the raw concentration indices HHI_N and C4
by DISP.
Extra variables. Capital-labor ratio KL is included to control for the in-
dustry specificities and to assess the influence of capital intensity. In-
dustries with high KL ratios could be highly concentrated (e.g. certain
machine-building industries) but unlike in theory, they could be unprofit-
able due to other factors (demand shocks, inefficient technologies). One
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may also consider KL as a control for another capital-intensive indus-
tries' specificity: in Ukraine, low capital depreciation rate could distort
profitability (the measure of profitability in this study embodies capital
depreciation). Finally, the purpose of KL ratio introduction in level form is
to catch the effect of entry barriers.1
Export EX and import IM are considered as factors of international competi-
tion. Firms (industries) with high level of exports in fact compete at the in-
ternational market that could mean higher efficiency and better (world level)
performance as well as higher competitive pressure that reduces profits. It
is also very important to catch the effect of the international competition at
the national market: higher import penetration increases competitive pres-
sure and decreases profitability. In this research EX is the total industries'
value of exports divided by the total industries' value of sales; IM is import
penetration ratio calculated as imports divided by sum of imports and do-
mestic total sales. Import in fact may be endogenous to profitability as prof-
itable markets attract international producers. Nevertheless, since predicted
effect of IM on profitability is negative and the likely effect of profitability on
IM is positive, the potential bias will not change the sign of the estimate: it
may only have an imprecise absolute value.
Finally, industry dummies D(x) are employed as controls for 2-digit in-
dustries' specificities.
                                               
1 Among entry barrier factors determining structure, economy of scale is recog-
nized as essential. Minimum efficient scale, calculated as weighted average ca-
pacity of top enterprises that produce about 50% of the industry output divided by
the market size, is used most often. It positively affects profitability: the higher is
the scale, the less likely the entry of a competitor. However, there are rational
opinions that such MES could not be an instrument for scale effect. Real scale
effect should be calculated based on the technological data of every enterprise,
which is hardly feasible. At the same time, a number of researchers argue that
MES in the form stated above can be a proxy for concentration (in that way those
researchers explain high correlation between concentration indices and MES).
Alternatively, MES calculated properly may be a good proxy for entry barriers that
in theory improve performance of incumbent firms.
Advertising-sales ratio is a proxy for entry barriers as well. Consumers recognize
products by ad messages being loyal to one selected brand for a long time. This
creates sunk cost for new contestants. Thus, the higher are the ad expenditures,
the higher the concentration, and the higher the profits. That is why, some re-
searchers include advertising variable in their specifications. Nevertheless, the
problem of good exogenous measure for Ads persists. In reality, higher profitabil-
ity would attract newcomers who are ready to bear sunk cost and advertise. This
is very often situation in Ukraine. Such potentially profitable industries as foods
and pharmaceuticals attract newcomers who start to familiarize their brands by
means of aggressive advertising.
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As regards Brown and Brown (1998), where the basic specification was
adopted from, besides the exclusion of MES, it differs from the present
study in several more ways. First, this research includes import penetration
ratio recognizing that import serves as a disciplinary tool for domestic firms.
Second, instead of the absolute capital requirements and the capital-output
ratio this paper uses KL ratio (described above). Third, the current study
does not aim to verify effect of ownership structure therefore it excludes
such variable (unlike Brown and Brown). Finally, the cross section nature of
the data does not allow using year-by-year industry growth as a control for
profit margins resulting from unanticipated growth.
The summary on computation of all variables is offered in Table 1. in the
Appendices.
Econometric model. The basic econometric specification used in the
research is as follows:
Profitability =
= β0 + β1Concentration + β2DISP + β3IM + β4EX + β5KL + β6ΣD(k) + u.
This model is estimated for two different samples: Nationwide and re-
gionally disaggregated Region-industry. In the Region-industry model, all
variables are calculated in the same manner as in the Nationwide model
for regional sub-industries. Only IM is calculated as nationwide since it is
difficult to track how imported goods are distributed within regions.
HHI_R and HHI_M are used for Concentration in the Region-industry
model. To test different variables, the standard PCM as well as PS and
PC for Profitability and HHI_N and C4 for Concentration will be employed
in regressions. Further, the Nationwide model is extended. Concentration
interactions HHI_N*DISP and C4*DISP enter the model together with
original HHI_N and C4 in order to test the hypothesis that the relation-
ship between concentration and profitability varies with different levels of
geographic concentration and that local markets are a source of market
power for oligopolistic industries.
I suggest Instrumental Variable (IV) 2SLS approach to cope with the en-
dogenous concentration variables. All concentration indices HHI_N, C4,
HHI_R, and HHI_M as well as interactions HHI_N*DISP and C4*DISP are
instrumented using all exogenous variables in the model plus additional
indices of concentration or interaction for the pre-reform year (1994).
These extra pre-reform indices being exogenous to post-reform profit-
ability help to solve the problem of endogenous concentration. DISP is
not instrumented. In practice geographic dispersion of industries does
not change considerably: with few exceptions, new enterprises appear in
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the same regions as the old ones, if appear at all. The discrepancy in the
DISP for the years 1994 and 1998 is mainly due to the disparity in the
sample coverage.
3.2. Data
Present study uses several data sources. The key one is the database
Fenix that consists of financial indices of the majority of Ukrainian
manufacturing enterprises for the year 1998 from the Derzhkomstat in-
dustrial registry (the Ministry of statistics of Ukraine). Derzhkomstat data
on 1994 enterprises' sales is used for the computation of instruments.
The Ministry's of Economy Database on imports gives the data for import
penetration ratios.
Let us proceed with the analysis of the raw data used for variables' com-
putation. Sales (UAH'000) represent all revenues received from the main
activity of an enterprise net of VAT and other activities' revenues. Cost
(UAH'000) is net cost of production including inputs, capital deprecia-
tion, excluding VAT, administrative and "sales" expenditures, interest
payments, and capital expenditures (investments). Employment (per-
sons) is the year-average quantity of employees. Export (UAH'000) is the
amount of enterprise's sales exported. Capital (UAH'000) is the balance-
sheet (initial, installation) value of production assets, excluding other
(non-productive) assets. Profit (UAH'000) is the net profit before profit
tax; it is an index that arises when total sales are decreased by VAT,
production cost, expenses and revenues obtained from other activities,
interest paid, and capital expenses. The raw data on Import (USD'000) is
represented by a sample of the so-called 4-digit product groups (1166
total). The majority of product groups (set of groups) matches corre-
sponding industry identifiers. If the industries are more disaggregated
than import product groups, I used the same amount of import for such
industries, e.g. two industries, the peat industry and the peat bricks in-
dustry, have import penetration ratios based on the same import item as
stated: "peat & peat brick". On the other hand, if imported products are
in several items, but domestically they are produced by one 5-digit in-
dustry, the import penetration ratio is built on the sum of analogous
product items. Import, initially represented in thousand USD, was con-
verted in 1998 UAH (1998 year-average exchange rate is 2.66
UAH/USD).
All financial data is firm level. Originally, it was obtained from enterprises'
financial reports. The year 1998's database covers 11045 enterprises;
the year 1994's sales dataset (used in calculation of pre-reform concen-
tration) consists of 8134 firm-entries. Derzhkomstat data does not in-
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clude de novo private or joint-ventures firms and consists primarily of the
former state manufacturing enterprises, privatized afterwards. Reported
employment varies from 1 to 36142 members of staff. Derzhkomstat
provides the opportunity to disaggregate industries by the standardized
5-digit industrial codes. After the exclusion of data on energy & heating
and water conduits (due to regulations and other non-market features of
these industries) the nationwide sample consists of 289 industries for the
year 1998 and of 271 for the year 1994. The pre-reform sample of en-
terprises is smaller. For that reason several other industries drop out in
IV estimation2. Every firm-entry in addition to the 5-digit industry identi-
fier has the 4-digit region identifier. There are 25 basic regions (oblasts),
plus Kiev and Sevastopol as separate territorial entities. Those separate
cities' enterprises were joined with the corresponding regions. Such
system of codification facilitated the computation of the mixed industrial
concentration index and the index of geographic concentration, as well
as to design special case of model specification, where variables were
calculated for region-industries. At the region-industry level the largest
sample is 1924 and 1907 non-missing entries are used in estimation.
Two samples are compared in the Table 5 in the Appendices. There is
evident difference between samples. Due to higher geographic concen-
tration of metal and chemical industries, their share in national sample is
bigger than in the region-industry sample. The opposite can be noticed
about light and food industries. The first preliminary comment is that the
influence of light and foods industries' peculiarities would be higher in
the regional-industry specification.
Brown and Brown (1999) analyzed Russian market structures among
others. It is interesting to compare our Ukrainian sample with the one
used by above-mentioned authors. The decomposition of the sample by
output is represented in the Table 6 in the Appendices. Casual analysis
of this table shows that Russian output structure is rather similar to
Ukrainian. The substantial difference is in energy, metallurgy, and foods,
where Ukraine outweighs Russia, and machine building and light indus-
tries, where the pattern is opposite. Another important lesson, or rather
pre-estimation prediction, is that such branches as metallurgy, machine
building, and food are important due to their dimensions: they could also
significantly influence estimation results.
                                               
2 Aluminum and magnesium rolling, Secondary non-metallic scrap processing,
Mining chemical, Asbestos, Agricultural tooling, Limestone flour, Vinyl, CD, tape
cassettes, Feed mill, Precious metals extraction and production, Elevators, Auto-
and electric loaders, Vacuum pumps, Zirconium and hafnium, Painting equipment
industries are among the drop-out entries.
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Let us now focus on C4 ratios of Ukrainian industries as compared to
Russian (Table 7(a) and Table 7(b) in the Appendices). It is easy to deal
with Russian industries, as industrial codes are the same for Ukraine
1998 and Russia 1992. The analysis of data reveals that Russian indus-
tries generally have more firms; they are less concentrated than Ukrain-
ian ones. Correlation between two C4 indices shows similar patterns.
Correlation (CR4 Ukraine; CR4 Russia) = 0.61.
Let us conclude the description of data with a brief analysis of summary
statistics (Table 8 and Table 9 in the Appendices). First, mean PCM in
the region-industry case is negative while in the national case it is posi-
tive. Second, concentration ratios differ as well: mean HHI_R is signifi-
cantly higher than mean HHI_N and mean HHI_M, and comparable to
mean C4. The pre-reform concentration indices have higher mean val-
ues, which could point out higher pre-reform concentration as well as
could be a product of smaller sample of pre-reform data. However,
those differences are sufficiently small and can be disregarded.
The correlation analysis (Table 10 in the Appendices) reveals that there
is no high correlation between variables in the model, except for DISP
and concentration ratios. Higher geographic concentration (lower value
of DISP) is associated with higher market concentration.
3.3. Estimation results
Primarily, performance measures were tested. Results of OLS disclosed
the superiority of PCM (Table 11 in the Appendices). For that reason only
PCM was used in estimation of latter models.
As proposed, this study employs the following strategy of econometric
estimation. There are two samples: Nationwide and Region-industry.
The former model uses C4, HHI_N, and interactions C4*DISP and
HHI_N*DISP. The latter one employs HHI_R and HHI_M. All estimations
are performed using both OLS and 2SLS IV approaches (Tables 12–14 in
the Appendices). The F-test of the joint significance of the instruments in
the IV first-stage regressions leaves no doubts about the acceptable
choice of instruments. The estimation with robust standard errors (using
White-corrected standard errors, not reported here) gives the same
signs, which proves the robustness of the estimated parameters. Ob-
tained R2 suggests that the Nationwide model specification is proved to
be more functional, whereas the Region-industry specification showed
low explanatory power.
As it is evident from the tables, the effect of concentration on PCM is not
established. C4 and HHI_N negatively affects PCM, still this effect is
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highly insignificant. Only Nationwide OLS specification produces signifi-
cant negative estimate of HHI_N. However, the Hausman test suggests
that OLS is an inconsistent estimator for this framework.3
The Region-industry model produces unexpected results as well. Here,
OLS exhibits negative statistically significant estimate of HHI_R. Mixed
concentration index does not affect profitability in this specification: the
estimates are insignificant. Specifications with interactions show that
profitability of nationwide industries is not sensitive to concentration: the
estimates are insignificant and negative. At the same time, localized in-
dustries benefit from higher local concentration, though this result is not
conclusive due to the problem of inadequate level of statistical signifi-
cance.
Concentration indices testing produced results that contradict general
theory and western experience. They also differ in some ways from the
results of previous studies of transition economies. Brown and Brown
(1998, 1999) reveal the comparable finding; still, the effect of local com-
petition is statistically significant in their study. In Konings, Van Cayseele,
and Warzynski (2001), higher concentration leads to higher profits in
Bulgaria, but this is not proven concerning Romania (yet their paper pro-
duces more persuasive evidence of positive concentration-performance
interrelation in Romania than the present one). Although Konings and
Xavier (2002) use different specification, concentration in their model
does not have any significant effect on the survival of enterprises. It be-
comes evident that the long history of concentration-profitability interre-
lation studies does not give the obvious results. Surely, there could be
some doubts about the data used for estimations and the nature of the
industrial concentration indices that differ from the preferred market
concentration indicators. However there are several credible remarks
about the flawed nature of competition in the transition economies. This
issue is addressed in the concluding section.
The importance of foreign competition is indicated by statistically signifi-
cant estimates of IM and EX variables in virtually all specifications. Only
                                               
3 As this study uses IV approach to avoid the drawback of endogenous concen-
tration variables, the Hausman test was performed with all specifications in order
to test whether there is sufficient difference between the coefficients of IV and
standard OLS to indicate that OLS is inconsistent in our specifications. The test
was performed with estimated intercepts, since the constant have the same inter-
pretation for both models, and with the variance from the more efficient estimator.
The Hausman test indicates that OLS is an inconsistent estimator for the Nation-
wide model. However, it fails to determine the appropriate specification for the
Region-industry model.
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Region-industry OLS specification with regional HHI_R index produced
insignificant estimate of IM (still negative). However, since the model
uses nationwide import penetration index in this specification (it is diffi-
cult to track how imported goods are distributed within regions), this in-
significant estimate may be addressed to that circumstance. The study
confirmed findings of previous researches: import can be a good disci-
plinary tool. Indeed, competitive pressure from imported products im-
pedes local producers' profitability. In that way, having negative, but
rather low correlation with PCM, IM produced highly significant esti-
mates, which confirms the hypothesis about competitive pressure from
importers. This pressure, although decreases profits, forces local pro-
ducers to be more efficient and makes consumers better-off.
On the other hand, export variable produced an unexpected result. Usu-
ally, exporters enjoy higher profitability. However, present study reports
different outcome. The first explanation of the negative EX estimate is
that exporters face higher competition from more efficient foreign pro-
ducers at the international markets. However, in such situation exporters
would prefer not to export at all to avoid anticipated losses. Thus, the
best explanation of results could be the data and the year of analysis.
1998 was the year of international financial crisis. Ukrainian exporters
faced a demand shock and incurred cost outlays were not covered dur-
ing that year.
KL has no stable sign. OLS procedures produce insignificant negative
estimates. From this it follows that KL could serve as a control for the
possible negative bias in profitability of capital-intensive industries. How-
ever, IV 2SLS estimation being preferred in the current study produces
the different result: KL has positive and significant effect on PCM. Thus,
high KL ratio can signify entry barriers. Incumbent firms enjoy the situa-
tion when the entry of newcomers is prevented with the high sunk cost.
Estimated parameters of industrial dummies (most are insignificant)
show no evidence of considerable differences between 2-digit sub-
industries. The only valuable finding is the negative significant parame-
ters of D1 (fuel) in the Nationwide framework and D2 (light industries)
and D7 (metallurgy) in the Region-industry framework. This may indicate
the poorer overall performance of mentioned industries.
Finally, let us consider geographic concentration ratio. The estimate of
DISP is negative (though insignificant). This reveals comparatively high
profitability of geographically concentrated industries. The higher is the
value of DISP (the lower the concentration), the poorer the performance.
As this index represents mostly consumer goods industries, this means
that the regional production of goods in such industries is rewarding. The
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reality verifies theoretical findings. One of the recent trends is the ap-
pearance of very competitive food producers in accordance with product
groups' climate zones: vegetables in southern regions, confectionary in
sugar-producing regions.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The goal of this research was to study the interrelation of profitability and
concentration, and to determine where the competitive pressure comes
from. A number of concentration indices were computed and employed
in various specifications. The research used exogenous pre-reform con-
centration ratios in the estimation of the instruments for concentration; it
helped to avoid the common problem of alike studies — concentration
endogenous to price-cost margin.
This work provided evidence that international trade increases competi-
tive pressure and negatively affects profitability.
The study, however, produced a number of unanticipated results: the
effect of domestic market concentration is not statistically significant and
frequently negative. Generally, competition has the same effect in every
economy: it makes firms more efficient. The same story is with monopo-
lization: it increases profitability in any economy (via the abuse of market
power), other things being equal. However, very often, market forces
distorted or softened in a transition economy do not play their genuine
role. Ukraine is a brilliant illustration of how market forces may fail to
function. In this country, the real market structure is rarely clear. A con-
cealed industrial group could patronize several seemingly competitive
firms or even entire industries, coordinating a big horizontally integrated
establishment. Vertically integrated conglomerates are the other distinc-
tive feature of Ukraine. Production chains of these businesses start from
metal mining and mineral extraction and finish with exported machinery.
Not only the concentration ratios lose their meaning, but also it is hard to
discriminate between industries. If one takes into consideration the soft
budget constraints and excessive government regulations (in Carlin,
Fries, Schaffer, and Seabright (2001), Ukraine is ranked 15-th out of 25
emerging economies in the soft budget constraints rating, and 21-st out
of 25 in business environment quality rating), it seems apparent that
market forces in Ukraine have enough barriers to fail to function.
Further, one may suspect that some peculiarities of the research subject
(Ukraine) would not allow designing a representative measure of con-
centration. Usually Herfindahl–Hirschman index is preferable to the C4 as
it considers all enterprises in the industry and takes into account the size
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distribution of firms. In such a way, one can explain bad performance of
C4 in the estimation. At the same time, there is no effective bankruptcy
legislation in Ukraine. Consequently, the virtually bankrupt firms go on
operating and are present in the sample used in the research. Informa-
tion about such firms is also embodied in HHI  index making it unable to
reflect the factual state of competition.
Finally, a portion of concern could be addressed to the year of the
analysis, 1998. Because of the financial crises in Asia and Russia and its
contagion effect within Ukraine, local firms, especially exporting, experi-
enced a demand shock (external and domestic). Considered and
planned cost outlays were not covered with sales revenues that year. As
it was supposed above, this is indeed the case with the negative esti-
mate of the export parameter.
In conclusion, it is essential to outline a number of further research ar-
eas. First, to access the interrelation between concentration and profit-
ability one would like to employ data that are more comprehensive: to
use data not only for the one-year period, but also for the several suc-
cessive periods (panel data set). This approach would eliminate the
drawback of possible bias resulting from year specificities. Second, a
deeper analysis of concentration evolution would be promising, as indi-
cated by an evident change in concentration indices.
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APPENDICES
A1. Discussion of differences between DISP and GC
As it is mentioned above, this paper uses DISP index of geographic con-
centration. The very close idea is exemplified in the other index — the index
of raw geographic concentration GC used by Ellison and Glaeser (1994):
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where sij is the share of the j-th industry's output in the i-th region and xi
is the share of the i-th region's output in total nationwide output, and
"(norm)" means normalized (divided by maximal estimated
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GC index has almost the same nature as DISP. The higher is the discrep-
ancy between the share of given industry's production in a region and the
share of total output in this region, the higher the geographic concentra-
tion of that industry, and the closer to zero the GC index would be. Ellison
and Glaeser (1994) argue that industries with high raw geographic con-
centration should have some stimulus to be as concentrated as they are.
They discuss two main reasons: the spillover effect and the natural ad-
vantage. Indeed, such industries as metallurgy and coal mining should be
geographically concentrated since they both enjoy spillover and natural
advantage effects. Fishing industry should have higher GC than baking
since bread is produced everywhere and fishing is possible at the sea-
coast. Yet, DISP and GC are different. Whereas DSIP embodies the differ-
ence between population and production shares in regions, GC embodies
irregularities in production only. Considering the different nature of the
population-output distribution in Ukraine (see Table 2 and Table 3) DISP
and GC should not be highly correlated. I presume, that DISP could be
applicable for the most part to consumer goods, since it employs popula-
tion shares in estimation, and GC could be applicable to investment or
non-consumer goods (the regions where output share bigger than popula-
tion share typically have heavy industries).
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The difference in meaning of GC and DISP could be otherwise explained
by the example. The coal-mining machine building industry is mainly con-
centrated around the coal mining industry in Donbass region (three east-
ern oblasts). Consequently, it sells its products in the same region, but not
nationwide. Almost all heavy industries are good examples. In such case, a
high regional concentration of an industry does not mean the operation all
over the country. The opposite is with DISP, which is associated with con-
sumer goods. Local production of wines (high geographic concentration)
can imply countrywide marketing.
Although GC index received the comprehensive portion of the analysis, it
is not used in the estimation. First reason is that it does not shed light on
the object of the analysis more than DISP does, though there are a
number of interesting features and differences that are beyond the
scope of this study and could be the theme of the further research. The
second reason is that DISP gives the opportunity to compare new find-
ings with other identical research, including Brown and Brown (1998).
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A2. Tables
Table 1. Definition of variables.
Profitability
 PCM Price-cost margin: sales minus cost divided by sales.
 PS Profit divided by sales.
 PC Profit divided by total cost.
Concentration
 HHI_N Herfindahl–Hirschman index: sum of the squared values of
firms' shares in sales (HHI ); commonly calculated for the
year 1998.
 C4 Share in sales accounted for by 4 largest firms.
 HHI_R HHI calculated at the level of regional industry (part of given
industry in one of 25 separate regions).
 HHI_M HHI_M = HHI_R*Prop + HHI_N*(1 – Prop), where Prop is the
proportion of regions with at least one producer in a given
industry. HHI_N and HHI_R are defined as above.
 DISP Measure of dispersion calculated as follows:
1
2
ij i
i
j
s SP
DISP
−
= −
∑
,
where sij is the share of the j-th industry output in the i-th
region and SPi is the share of population in the i-th region.
 HHI_N*DISP Interaction of original nationwide HHI_N and dispersion DISP.
 C4*DISP Interaction of C4 and dispersion DISP.
 IHHI_N, etc. The index I (for instrument) before the concentration variable
means that this concentration ratio, whether original HHI_N,
weighted HHI_W, mixed HHI_M, or C4 is calculated as
described above for the pre-reform year 1994 and used for
instrumental variable estimation.
Extra
 KL Capital divided by Employment.
 EX Export divided by Sales.
 IM Import penetration ratio. Import divided by (Total domestic
enterprises' Sales plus Import).
 D(x) Industry dummies D1, …, D8 for branches (no dummy for
"other industries" sub-branch).
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Table 2. Differences in shares (%) of population and output by region.
Regions Population share Output share Difference
Donetsk 17.4 19.1 –1.7
Dnipropetrovsk 11.1 17.6 –6.5
Lugansk 8.3 6.8 1.5
Kiev 7.1 8.3 –1.2
Kharkiv 6.4 6.6 –0.2
Zaporizhya 5.5 8.2 –2.7
Lviv 5.2 2.9 2.2
Poltava 3.2 6.1 –3.0
Sumy 3.1 0.4 2.7
Vinnitsia 2.8 2.0 0.8
Zhitomir 2.7 1.5 1.2
Cherkasy 2.5 2.2 0.3
Odessa 2.4 2.1 0.4
Khmelnitsky 2.4 2.0 0.4
Mykolayiv 2.3 2.7 –0.4
Ivano-Frankivsk 2.3 2.2 0.2
Crimea 2.2 2.1 0.1
Transcarpathian 2.0 0.6 1.3
Chernigiv 1.9 1.7 0.2
Rivne 1.8 0.5 1.3
Kirovograd 1.7 0.8 0.9
Kherson 1.6 1.3 0.3
Ternopil 1.6 0.8 0.7
Volyn 1.3 0.7 0.5
Chernivtsi 1.2 0.7 0.5
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Table 3. DISP and GC in comparison.
Mean Min Max Correlation
GC 0.631 ≈0 0.976
DISP 0.569 0.347 0.803
0.4935
Table 4. Pre-reform and After-reform concentration ratios correlation.
HHI_N, 1998 HHI_N, 1994 C4, 1998 C4, 1994
HHI_N, 1998 1.0000
HHI_N, 1994 0.7945 1.0000
C4, 1998 0.7504 0.6883 1.0000
C4, 1994 0.6642 0.7539 0.8681 1.0000
Table 5. Structure of National and Region-industry samples (1998).
National sample
Region-industry
sample
Metallurgy, % 9.8 4.8
Chemicals, % 10.5 6.0
Machine building, % 39.9 38.8
Wood and paper, % 3.6 5.1
Construction materials and glass, % 11.6 10.0
Light industry, % 8.7 10.7
Foods, % 9.8 18.5
Other, % 6.2 6.0
Total, % 100.0 100.0
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Table 6. Decomposition of the sample by output (1998), comparison with Russia
(1992).
Branch Ukraine 1998 Russia 1992
Energy, % 14.0 9.4
Metallurgy, % 31.0 18.7
Chemicals, % 7.0 10.7
Machine building, % 17.0 26.0
Wood and paper, % 2.0 4.4
Construction materials and glass, % 4.0 3.4
Light industry, % 2.0 9.1
Foods, % 20.0 13.3
Other, % 3.0 4.7
Data on Russia 1992 source: Brown and Brown (1999).
Table 7(a). Selected (44) industries' C4 and the number of enterprises, compari-
son with Russia (1992).
Russia 1992 Ukraine 1998
Code Name # of
firms
C4
# of
firms
C4
16152 Bricks and ceramic tiles 550 7 224 26
15271 Furniture industry 623 12 250 14
16112 Cement 49 22 17 80
19400 Printing industry 1493 23 346 35
15210 Sawmill production 468 25 68 72
14140 Mining machinery 55 30 50 49
13150 Varnish and paint 78 32 39 54
15310 Cellulose, wood pulp, paper,
cartons 114 32 24 64
14620 Food and animal feed
equipment 93 34 74 39
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Russia 1992 Ukraine 1998
Code Name # of
firms
C4
# of
firms
C4
14321 Instruments for controlling
and regulating processes 91 34 42 59
11220 Oil refining 91 37 20 89
17310 Natural leather 71 38 26 77
16240 Insulation materials 42 38 11 86
15250 Veneer, plywood, all woods 35 38 12 96
14160 Railway machinery 56 39 26 89
16513 Glass packages 40 40 16 65
16272 Asphalt production 33 41 19 73
14210 Metal cutting tools 91 41 32 50
16551 China and pottery 27 43 18 59
14220 Wood processing equipment 36 44 13 92
13120 Chemical fibers 25 45 8 100
14175 Accumulator and cell
industry 31 45 8 100
16232 Lime, gypsum products 45 47 16 62
13111 Nitrogen industry 22 48 7 89
13363 Rubber shoes 28 48 7 100
19770 Toy production 59 50 10 82
14195 Industrial valves 37 50 18 59
19720 Musical instruments 29 52 10 92
13130 Synthetic resins, plastic pulp 36 53 11 100
14230 Forge and pressing
equipment 35 53 17 76
14325 Instruments for the
measurement of mechanical
quantities 33 56 13 69
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Russia 1992 Ukraine 1998
Code Name # of
firms
C4
# of
firms
C4
14324 Optical and
optical-mechanical
instruments 40 57 15 78
14350 Ball bearings 28 59 8 100
14153 Continuous transport 11 64 5 100
13351 Tires 12 67 3 100
14194 Pumps 29 68 9 95
14342 Motorcycle, bicycle
production 15 70 8 100
13112 Phosphate fertilizers,
inorganic chemicals 18 74 10 85
12140 Steel pipes 19 74 17 86
14111 Turbine building 25 75 6 100
14112 Boilers 35 76 8 100
14834 Metal transport containers 14 86 16 100
12150 Electro ferroalloy 6 91 3 100
18131 Perfume and cosmetics 45 93 9 91
Data on Russia 1992 source: Brown and Brown (1999).
Table 7(b). Selected (80) industries' C4 and the number of enterprises, compari-
son with Russia (1992); comparative statistics.
Russia 1992 Ukraine 1998
# of firms C4 # of firms C4
Mean 139 18 52 20
Min 3 4 3 14
Max 1612 100 616 100
Correlation, C4 0.618
Correlation, # of firms 0.925
Data on Russia 1992 source: Brown and Brown (1999).
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Table 8. Region-industry sample summary statistics.
Number of
observations
Mean
Standard
deviation
Min Max
PCM 1913 –0.125 3.688 –112.290 0.965
PS 1914 –0.178 1.394 –45.600 5.358
PC 1911 –0.112 1.290 –43.653 5.297
HHI_R 1919 0.702 0.312 0.028 1.000
IHHI_R 1924 0.733 0.306 0.031 1.000
HHI_M 1919 0.452 0.213 0.016 1.000
IHHI_M 1924 0.498 0.221 0.032 1.000
KL 1918 46.062 71.646 0.105 2460.069
EX 1924 0.193 1.995 0.000 92.361
IM 1924 0.325 0.289 0.000 0.992
Table 9. Nationwide sample summary statistics.
Number of
observations
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
PCM 289 0.063 0.795 –9.274 0.943
PS 289 –0.534 6.986 –118.158 0.704
PC 289 –0.330 3.587 –43.653 2.989
HHI_N 289 0.378 0.306 0.006 1.000
IHHI_N 271 0.397 0.317 0.008 1.000
C4 289 0.783 0.247 0.067 1.000
IC4 271 0.794 0.239 0.097 1.000
KL 289 59.833 62.698 4.657 704.194
EX 289 0.213 0.357 0.000 4.188
IM 289 0.405 0.323 0.000 0.996
DISP 289 0.569 0.069 0.348 0.804
IDISP 271 0.576 0.070 0.365 0.876
HHI_N*DISP 289 0.208 0.162 0.005 0.587
IHHI_N*IDISP 271 0.220 0.172 0.005 0.664
C4*DISP 289 0.440 0.137 0.054 0.644
IC4*IDISP 271 0.447 0.137 0.065 0.710
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Table 10. Key variables' correlation.
PCM PS PC KL EX IM HHI_N C4 DISP
PCM 1.00
PS 0.20 1.00
PC 0.08 0.71 1.00
KL –0.11 –0.03 0.01 1.00
EX –0.45 0.03 0.03 0.00 1.00
IM –0.19 0.02 –0.06 0.10 0.02 1.00
HHI_N –0.28 –0.15 –0.19 0.18 0.18 0.26 1.00
C4 –0.15 –0.07 –0.08 0.19 0.13 0.28 0.75 1.00
DISP 0.10 0.06 0.08 –0.04 –0.16 –0.15 –0.36 –0.34 1.00
Table 11. Profitability measures testing, OLS.
PCM PS PE
HHI_N –0.442*** (–2.786) –3.304** (–2.120) –2.416*** (–3.006)
DISP –0.620 (–0.955) 0.351 (0.055) 0.081 (0.025)
IM –0.347** (–2.517) 0.772 (0.569) –0.450 (–0.644)
EX –0.956*** (–7.987) 0.731 (0.622) 0.348 (0.574)
KL –0.001 (–1.076) 0.012 (1.546) 0.005 (1.401)
D1 –0.086 (–0.318) –9.406*** (–3.544) –3.035 (–2.218)
D2 –0.083 (–0.375) –0.378 (–0.174) 0.166 (0.148)
D3 0.183 (0.843) –0.393 (–0.184) 0.105 (0.096)
D4 –0.051 (–0.278) 0.002 (0.001) 0.056 (0.060)
D5 0.080 (0.284) –0.183 (–0.066) –0.115 (–0.081)
D6 0.038 (0.180) 0.344 (0.168) 0.122 (0.115)
D7 0.130 (0.584) 0.034 (0.016) –0.035 (–0.031)
D8 0.102 (0.474) –0.019 (–0.009) –1.654 (–1.512)
CONS 0.962** (2.181) –0.189 (–0.044) 0.555 (0.248)
R2 0.276 0.095 0.087
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
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Table 12(a). OLS Estimation of Nationwide model; C4 as concentration.
PCM Original specification Specification with interaction
C4*DISP 1.844 (0.807)
C4 –0.040 (–0.205) –1.120 (–0.828)
DISP –0.071 (–0.109) –1.249 (–0.780)
IM –0.439*** (–3.150) –0.438*** (–3.141)
EX –0.990*** (–8.196) –0.979*** (–8.059)
KL –0.001 (–1.042) –0.001 (–1.048)
D1 –0.157 (–0.575) –0.148 (–0.541)
D2 –0.152 (–0.679) –0.159 (–0.710)
D3 0.126 (0.573) 0.122 (0.557)
D4 –0.023 (–0.124) –0.039 (–0.210)
D5 0.170 (0.602) 0.151 (0.532)
D6 0.019 (0.089) 0.013 (0.061)
D7 0.152 (0.675) 0.145 (0.641)
D8 0.140 (0.636) 0.135 (0.613)
CONS 0.556 (1.145) 1.267 (1.260)
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.258
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
Table 12(b). IV Estimation of Nationwide model; C4 as concentration.
PCM Original specification
Specification
with interaction
C4*DISP 0.621 (0.078)
C4 –0.074 (–0.409) –0.435 (–0.094)
DISP –0.182 (–0.357) –0.576 (–0.113)
IM –0.349*** (–3.180) –0.349*** (–3.184)
EX –1.131*** (–12.148) –1.128*** (–10.771)
KL 0.001** (2.032) 0.001** (2.020)
D1 –0.410* (–1.922) –0.405* (–1.817)
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PCM Original specification
Specification
with interaction
D2 0.085 (0.481) 0.084 (0.473)
D3 0.158 (0.922) 0.158 (0.922)
D4 0.011 (0.077) 0.007 (0.046)
D5 0.218 (1.015) 0.214 (0.951)
D6 0.013 (0.082) 0.013 (0.077)
D7 0.220 (1.279) 0.219 (1.267)
D8 0.170 (1.005) 0.170 (1.006)
CONS 0.511 (1.315) 0.746 (0.243)
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.379
Hausman test: OLS
is inconsistent χ2(11) = 71.06 p = 0.000 χ2(11) = 70.56 p = 0.000
F-test of significance
of IVs in the 1-stage
regression
C4
C4*DISP
F(13,257) =
= 66.87 p= 0.000
F(14,256) =
= 72.24
= 59.45
p = 0.000
p = 0.000
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
Table 13(a). OLS Estimation of Nationwide model; HHI_N as concentration.
PCM Original specification Specification with interaction
HHI_N*DISP 3.437 (1.118)
HHI_N –0.442*** (–2.786) –2.303 (–1.377)
DISP –0.620 (–0.955) –1.275 (–1.459)
IM –0.347** (–2.517) –0.362*** (–2.613)
EX –0.956*** (–7.987) –0.940*** (–7.802)
KL –0.001 (–1.076) –0.001 (–1.118)
D1 –0.086 (–0.318) –0.097 (–0.358)
D2 –0.083 (–0.375) –0.112 (–0.504)
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PCM Original specification Specification with interaction
D3 0.183 (0.843) 0.169 (0.777)
D4 –0.051 (–0.278) –0.079 (–0.430)
D5 0.080 (0.284) 0.052 (0.186)
D6 0.038 (0.180) 0.014 (0.067)
D7 0.130 (0.584) 0.100 (0.446)
D8 0.102 (0.474) 0.086 (0.397)
CONS 0.962** (2.181) 1.352** (2.405)
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.243
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
Table 13(b). IV Estimation of Nationwide model; HHI_N as concentration.
PCM Original specification Specification with interaction
HHI_N*DISP 0.277 (0.031)
HHI_N –0.144 (–0.858) –0.294 (–0.061)
DISP –0.287 (–0.557) –0.341 (–0.188)
IM –0.334*** (–3.061) –0.335*** (–2.970)
EX –1.121*** (–11.991) –1.119*** (–10.653)
KL 0.001** (2.002) 0.001** (1.984)
D1 –0.393* (–1.845) –0.393* (–1.844)
D2 0.097 (0.546) 0.095 (0.516)
D3 0.170 (0.996) 0.169 (0.985)
D4 0.000 (0.001) –0.002 (–0.012)
D5 0.197 (0.913) 0.195 (0.860)
D6 0.013 (0.078) 0.011 (0.067)
D7 0.212 (1.242) 0.210 (1.139)
D8 0.167 (1.003) 0.166 (0.973)
CONS 0.563 (1.587) 0.594 (0.543)
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.388
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Continued from p. 35
PCM Original specification Specification with interaction
Hausman test: OLS
is inconsistent χ2(11) = 71.97 p = 0.000 χ2(11) = 70.79 p = 0.000
F-test of significance
of IVs in the 1-stage
regression
HHI_N
HHI_N*DISP
F(13,257) =
= 42.36 p = 0.000
F(14,256) =
= 42.32
= 40.34
p = 0.000
p = 0.000
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
Table 14(a). OLS Region-industry model estimation.
PCM Original specification
Specification with mixed
concentration
HHI_R –0.574** (–2.006)
HHI_M –0.545 (–1.347)
IM –0.457 (–1.402) –0.547* (–1.701)
EX –0.132*** (–3.564) –0.132*** (–3.558)
KL –0.001 (–0.550) –0.001 (–0.640)
D1 0.099 (0.127) 0.075 (0.096)
D2 –0.943* (–1.802) –0.985* (–1.882)
D3 0.092 (0.185) 0.074 (0.150)
D4 –0.142 (–0.383) –0.183 (–0.494)
D5 –0.071 (–0.138) –0.043 (–0.084)
D6 –0.233 (–0.534) –0.252 (–0.577)
D7 –0.909** (–2.093) –0.897** (–2.059)
D8 0.007 (0.019) 0.047 (0.117)
CONS 0.702 (1.771) 0.592 (1.497)
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.020
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
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Table 14(b). IV Region-industry model estimation.
PCM Original specification
Specification
with mixed concentration
HHI_R –0.343 (–0.870)
HHI_M –0.4414 (–0.732)
IM –0.501 (–1.518) –0.5508* (–1.710)
EX –0.133*** (–3.576) –0.1326*** (–3.563)
KL –0.001 (–0.592) –0.0008 (–0.643)
D1 0.096 (0.124) 0.07796 (0.100)
D2 –0.991 (–1.883) –0.9992* (–1.896)
D3 0.053 (0.106) 0.05934 (0.119)
D4 –0.170 (–0.457) –0.1887 (–0.508)
D5 –0.062 (–0.121) –0.0438 (–0.086)
D6 –0.238 (–0.545) –0.2511 (–0.574)
D7 –0.922** (–2.123) –0.9054** (–2.072)
D8 0.017 (0.041) 0.04359 (0.109)
CONS 0.572 (1.347) 0.55193 (1.277)
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.020
Hausman test: OLS
is inconsistent χ2(1) = 0.73 p = 0.393 χ2(1) = 0.05 p = 0.817
F-test of significance
of IVs in the 1-stage
regression
HHI_R
HHI_M
F(11,1900) =
=240.22 p = 0.000
F(11,1900) =
= 156.16 p = 0.000
t-statistics are in parentheses; * — significant at 10%, ** — significant at 5%, *** — significant
at 1%.
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